Free-will

Do we have free will? For over a half century, I never questioned—and no one ever asked. I’m sure I didn’t doubt I had free will. But it would be hard to avoid thinking this way being brought up in an average American household. But if we do have free will—how free are we?

The two most relevant positions on this question, at least in my opinion, are hard-determinism and compatibilism. The hard determinist simply concludes that because of cause and effect we have no choice, we just do what follows—no free will. The compatibilist agrees with the cause and effect theory but protects our ability to choose as much as possible in that the compatibilist thinks cause and effect and choice are compatible—free will.

While reading about one of the more contemporary philosophers, Stace, I thought I had found someone who explained compatibilism in clear, concise everyday language. Stace takes the compatibilist position because it gives him some latitude as he thinks this is necessary to protect the concept of free will. What makes the notion of free will so important and so important to understand? Probably most importantly; free will and our understanding of it, dictates our understanding of morality and our responsibility to it. One of the obvious institutions to be directly affected by our stance on moral responsibility is the justice system.

Not enough free will and we are not responsible for our behaviors—too much free will and we are responsible for every behavior we may exhibit. I agree; it’s an ideal worth protecting. But, only the correct understanding of free-will allows the conditions in which to form the proper moral and legal paradigms for the improvement of humankind. I am inclined to agree with Stace at this point; in that I think we would be in big trouble if we had to abandon morality and responsibility for our actions in favor of hard-determinism.

In defense of his position, Stace points out that the hard-determinist, those who deny free will, live their lives, outside of their lecture rooms and studies, as though they have free will. He says, “They will ask their children why they didn’t tell the truth, and then punish them as if they had a choice in the matter”. No doubt, this contradicts determinism.

But the conclusion of a determinist doesn’t necessarily lose all credibility at this point. The determinist thinks all choices are derived from previous events, and these events, the causes and effects, predicate our choices—therefore we are not free. Where Stace diverges from the determinist is on choice. This compatibilist agrees there is a causal link between events and choices, but thinks we are free to choose as long as we are not inhibited by any external force. Specifically, as long as we are not coerced by outside forces we are free to choose according to our desires and motivations. Therein, we are free. In fact Stace separates free acts from unfree acts this way. Free acts proceed from making choices which, although proceeding from previous events; the choices are based on one’s own desires and motivations.

Here is where I have to part company with Stace. I don’t understand how he ignored what seems to be the more significant source of constraints plaguing our choices and behaviors—that of the internal constraints. Turns out there have been others who bring up this same, very important distinction. Surely there are physical factors which inhibit our choices, but the ones used to demonstrate external constraints; stranded in a desert, doing something because you are threatened, or leaving an area because you are dragged away, are not the forces which normally interfere with our freedom.

At the top of the list of disabling factors when it comes to free will are things such as tradition and culture, religion and education. Then there is the fact of psychological and physiological abnormality. I think it is more relevant to ask if we are able to make a free choice, free from the over arching influence of these factors than to talk about external, physical limitations—at least in our culture for sure.

An example which illustrates the difference in internal and external constraints is of Socrates. At the end of his life Socrates was constrained—twice. When he was incarcerated his choices were limited by external forces and when his friends offered to sneak him out of the city his choice was limited by internal forces. In that Socrates was deeply convicted that the way he had led his life was the right way there was no other way for him to live—so he couldn’t leave. Turns out, he could have escaped the external constraints, but there was no way for him to escape the internal constraints.

The example of Gandhi is also important in the description of free will. Gandhi was not stranded in a desert; he chose not to eat. We could say he made a free choice—but did he? Could he have made another choice? If we believe the notion of cause and effect then we believe there was a series of events, causes and effects, leading up to the point in Gandhi’s life which culminated in the strong belief that he must do what he could to help the people of India. Whatever the forces were that caused Gandhi to be the person he was at this time in his life, they were sufficient to determine his unique choices and behaviors. His path in life had taken him to a point at which he believed that fasting would pressure the government to let go of India. This makes for an interesting question: Was Gandhi able to do anything other than fast now that events in his life created his personal reality—that fasting means helping India?

Perhaps for someone with the strong conviction regarding right and wrong of Socrates the idea of sneaking away may not enter his mind. If the same situation arose for someone with less conviction he may choose to escape. Could we say this person would be making a free choice because he chose to escape? Or would we have to say because of the causal events leading to this point in his life this would be the only decision he could make.

So…what is free when referring to free-will? It seems that intentions arise in our minds as they will. The ever busy brain is constantly responding to external and internal stimuli. We are aware of some of this and it is familiar to us as the process of thinking. But how do these thoughts, desires and intentions arise. In short it all starts with a biological event. A physical process occurs in the brain which we ultimately experience as a non-physical process of the mind. As Sam Harris says “our thoughts are unauthored, but are author to our actions”.

Certainly the types of desires and intentions which randomly arise in our minds are contingent on what life has created as reality for each of us. On one hand we may think, now that the desire has surfaced we are free to act on it as we choose. On the other, we have to wonder if our choices are as inextricably linked to the past events as the desire was that popped into our mind.

Are we free? I don’t know. I like to think I have some responsibility for how I behave. One thing we can know for sure—I think—is the sum of our experiences, mental processes and whatever control we get to bring to our lives is evident in our behaviors.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *